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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming a decision of

the Weber County Division of the Second Judicial District Court
that is in direct conflict with a November 1971 decision of JUDGE
THORNLEY K. SWAN in the Davis County Division of the Second
Judicial District Court on the issue of collectable automobiles?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming a trial

court»s summary disposition of important questions of municipal
law which will have wide spread general impact in Utah?
3.

Did the Court of Appeals err by failing to recognize the

improper motives of Defendant/Respondents in making
Plaintiff/Petitioners the only persons against whom a 38-year old
lapsed ordinance had ever been enforced?
4.

Did the Court of Appeals err by not holding both the

trial judge and trial counsel to an equally high standard of
judicial conduct and professional representation as established
by recent decisions of this Court and by the language of Rule 56
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was rendered in
Case No. 900160-CA.

The opinion was not published.

A copy

thereof is included as Appendix A.
JURISDICTION
1.

Date of Entry:

The decision of the Utah Court of

Appeals was entered on May 2, 1990.

2.

Order re Extension of Time:

An ex party motion for

extension of time to file a Petition of Certiorari was filed on
May 29, 1990, and an order granting a 30-day extension from the
date of entry of the Utah Court of Appeals decision was entered
on May 29, 1990.
3.

Jurisdiction:

Rule 46(b), Rule 46(c), and Rule 46(d)

U.R.A.P. provide statutory authority for this Court to review the
decision in question.
RELEVANT LAW
1.

Rule 56, (b) (d) (e) (f) U.R.C.P.:
(b)

A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or

cross claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment sought, may at
any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
Affidavits under subpart (e) or (f) of Rule 56 U.R.C.P.
not required:
When read in the light of subdivision (d), it is clear that
subdivision (e) requirement that a party opposing the summary
judgment motion file affidavits in support of the motion applies
only when the opposing party has elected to and has filed
affidavits in support of his motion.

If the moving party chooses

not to or simply fails to file affidavits, subdivision (e) is
inapplicable.

(Gadd v. Olson, 685 P2d 1041 (Utah 1984).

Appendix F.)

2

(See

(c)
deposition.
(d)

Trial court's duty relative to facts as found by
(Text is set forth in its entirety in Appendix C.)
Trial court's duty to interrogate counsel to

ascertain material facts.

(Text is set forth in its entirety in

Appendix C.)
(e)

Counsel on appeal is unable to determine from the

exhibits furnished by opposing counsel to the Court of Appeals
whether or not Defendant/Respondent's July 3, 1989, Memorandum
was supported by affidavits and, therefore, assumes that subpart
(e) does not apply.
(f)

Trial court's duty to order a continuance to

permit copy of Defendant City's Zoning Inspector's deposition to
be produces.

(Text is set forth in its entirety in Appendix C.)

1952 Centerville City ordinance pertinent language,
Centerville City ordinance 1968, Centerville City ordinance March
17, 1970, December 17, 1985, pertinent sections.
City nuisance ordinance enacted April 1, 1970.

Centerville
(Appendix D.)

Utah State Statutes, 41-1-195 thru 41-1-198 UCA 1953 as
amended April 23, 1990, Collector Motor Vehicles defined,
optional titles; 41-1-79.5 Abandoned and inoperable vehicles,
Determined by Commission.

(Appendix E.)

TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
Hearings of July 27, 1988, November 8, 1989, and December
13, 1989, when second order for summary judgment was rendered.
(Appendix B.)
3

Applicable Utah State Statutes cited.
Case law cited.

(Appendix E.)

(Appendix F.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action in the Trial Court is the attempt of a husband
and wife who are joint tenants of real property fronting on Utah
State Road 106 without pedestrian sidewalk to stop the six-yearold prosecution of Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, and reverse the
criminal conviction in the Bountiful Division of the Second
Circuit Court of Petitioner, VERLE ROBERTS, which was not timely
appealed by former counsel.

Petitioners sought to establish a

nonconforming use. At all times relevant to this action,
Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, has had sole title to SIX (6) or more
automobiles properly titled under Utah State statutes.
VERLE ROBERTS is the Co-Petitioner/Appellant with her
husband, J. VAL ROBERTS.

At no time has VERLE ROBERTS ever owned

any interest in any of the automobiles that are the subject of
this action.
VERLE ROBERTS has never had anything more than a joint
tenant interest in the real property owned by Petitioners at 499
North Main, Centerville, Davis County, Utah.
Petitioner/Appellants claim a prior existing, nonconforming
use to the municipal ordinance making the keeping of inoperable
automobiles on private A-l property within the City for periods
varying from SEVEN (7) to THIRTY (30) days maximum a nuisance
punishable as a criminal misdemeanor.
4

Section 41-1-195(4) UCA 1953, Laws of Utah 1990, ch. 292,
effective April 23, 1990, (Appendix E) was not argued in the
Lower Court in December of 1989 when the decision appealed from
was rendered nor was it presented to the Utah Court of Appeals
because Petitioners had no knowledge of its enactment.

This

statute makes lawful the accumulation of a class of motor
vehicles known as "collector motor vehicles which applies to any
vehicle 20 years or older that is not used on the highway and has
been acquired primarily as a collector's item."

(Full text

Appendix E.)
The new statute does away with the requirements of the City
ordinances complained of herein for all automobiles acquired
primarily as collector's items and voids the decision of the
Lower Court and of the Court of Appeals as well as all similar
ordinances among the 228 incorporated cities and towns of the
State of Utah.
Petitioner/Appellants being the only persons in the City of
Centerville to have ever been prosecuted in 38 years under any of
the City ordinances cited, had discussed with their counsel in
the Lower Court the doctrine of dissuaitude, and believe that he
was prepared to argue Petitioners1 United States Constitutional
rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to be protected from prosecution for violation of an
ordinance that had lapsed for want of enforcement over nearly
FOUR decades.

The trial court judge precipitously invoked a

doctrine from a foreign jurisdiction in a 1972 Colorado case
5

which he ruled, without making specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law, gave the Court authority to decide the matter
by summary judgment.

Neither Petitioner in the case at bar was

advised by their counsel to attend the December 13, 1989,
hearing.

The affidavits of JAMES G. PARRISH, DAVID F. PARRISH,

and LARRY G. SMITH were present in the record raising issues of
fact that were disputed.

(Appendix B, TR page 13, line 21.)

(For full text, see Appendix I.)

In addition, the deposition of

Centerville City Zoning Enforcement Officer, RANDY RANDALL, taken
by Appellants' trial counsel established as undisputed the
nonenforcement of any of the Centerville City ordinances relating
to the storage of motor vehicles on private property within the
City against any other persons similarly situated at any time
pertinent to the issues raised before the Lower Court, before the
Utah Court of Appeals, and before this Honorable Court.

Counsel

for Defendant/Respondents1 claim that Petitioner's trial counsel
had not taken the deposition of Centerville City's Zoning
Enforcement Officer, RANDY RANDALL, described the posture of the
case on July 27, 1988, but was not an accurate statement of the
case when summary judgment was entered on December 13, 1989.
There were clearly issues of fact which were material and which
should have precluded disposition of the case by summary
judgment.
In the handling of this case on appeal, Petitioner, J. VAL
ROBERTS, states that in accordance with the Anders Doctrine of
the United States Supreme Court that he believes that the
6

Petition for Certiorari raises important constitutional questions
under both the Utah and the United States Constitutions which he
is not competent to handle for himself or in behalf of his wife
as her attorney on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
No evidentiary hearing was held in this matter.

Both of the

Petitioner/Appellants in this case have been subjected to
numerous criminal prosecutions in connection with Petitioner, J.
VAL ROBERTS'S, private collection of collector automobiles.

The

most recent criminal complaints were authorized by JERALD JENSEN,
Justice of the Peace for Centerville City and a member of the
City Council which, prior to his being appointed Justice of the
Peace, solicited the criminal prosecution of both Petitioners
herein by appointing a special prosecutor pro tern, in the person
of THEODORE E. KANELL, Attorney at Law.
VERLE ROBERTS was convicted of a criminal misdemeanor in
Centerville Justice of the Peace Court by special Judge Pro Tern.
DAVID YOUNG PAYNE, ESQ., who refused to dismiss the case against
her notwithstanding the undisputed facts that she owned none of
the automobiles, had no interest in any of their titles, and that
her only interest in the real property where the automobiles are
stored is that of a joint tenant.

Even when special prosecutor,

TED KANELL, and Petitioner's trial counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD,
ESQ., signed a written stipulation agreeing to the dismissal,
Justice of the Peace, DAVID YOUNG PAYNE, refused to dismiss the
7

case and on his instructions, Petitioner was found guilty of a
criminal misdemeanor.

When the District Court refused trial

counsel's application for an injunction to stop the prosecution
until the issues raised by the pending civil challenge to the
ordinances could be decided on appeal to the Second Circuit
Court, Bountiful Department, Petitioner was again convicted of a
criminal misdemeanor even though she had no interest in the
automobiles, had only a joint tenancy interest in the real
property where the automobiles are stored, and had no means short
of a divorce to compel Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, to remove any
of the automobiles which are the subject of the several actions
in the Lower Court and of the appeal herein.
All criminal action against Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, for
violation of any of the Centerville City ordinances complained of
herein were either reversed on appeal to the Second Circuit
Court, Bountiful Department, or have been dismissed with
prejudice at the suggestion of Centerville City's special
prosecutor, TED KANELL, and the concurrence of trial counsel,
BRIAN M. BARNARD.
The City of Centerville and the Utah State Department of
transportation have been seeking to coerce Petitioners into a
donation of approximately 600 square feet of Petitioners'
property fronting on Utah State Road 106 for a sidewalk easement
since 1975.

(Appendix G.)

Centerville City renewed the attempt

to claim a right-of-way easement at what City Administrator,
DAVID HALES, apparently believed was the conclusion of the case
8

at bar by summary disposition in the Lower Court on January 3,
1990.

(Appendix H.)

The Trial Court initially entered summary judgment without
notice to ATTORNEY BRIAN M. BARNARD and subsequently withdrew its
first judgment and conducted a hearing on December 13, 1989. So
far as Petitioners can determine, the Lower Court entered no
findings of fact in support of its decision.

The Utah Court of

Appeals sanctioned the Lower Court's methods of decision.

(See

second full paragraph, page 5, Utah Court of Appeals Decision,
Appendix A.)
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
Absent elaboration by the Utah Supreme Court on the
considerations that will invoke one or more of the subparts of
Rule 46 U.R.A.P., Petitioners suggest relevant United States
Supreme Court doctrine.

In Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 506,

515 (1897) (emphasis added), the Court said,
"It
is a power which will
be sparingly
exercised,***the necessity of avoiding conflict
between two or more courts of appeal or between
courts of appeal and courts of a
state,***11
The text, Federal Practice and Procedure, at Sec. 16(c) by
Professors Wright A. Miller, E. Cooper, and E. Gressman, Sec.
4004 at 507-08 states,
"As the number of cases seeking review has grown,
the docket has had to be devoted***to statutory
questions that are likely to have wide spread
general impact."

9

First Question Presented;

Did the Court of Appeals err in

affirming a decision of the Weber County Division of the Second
Judicial District Court that is in direct conflict with a
November 1971 decision of JUDGE THORNLEY K. SWAN in the Davis
County Division of the Second Judicial District Court on the
issue of collectable automobiles?
Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, has relied upon the Second
District

Court

decision

on

the

issue

of

storage

of

old

automobiles which was rendered in Davis County in November of
1971, and has assembled a private collection of Volkswagen
automobiles, a 1941 flat head Ford pickup truck, and a 1954 flat
head Ford one-ton truck which are, by State statute, horseless
carriages,

(See Appendix E.)

Unfortunately, Court records in Davis County have been
computerized only back to 1981.

All of the older files are

stored in boxes in the basement of the Courthouse, and the
handwritten file indexes which were prepared before the files
went into storage are no longer helpful in locating the cases
decided before 1981.
Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, located a collateral reference
to the 1971 Davis County case and forwarded a request to trial
counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD, that he contact the attorney who
successfully defended MELVIN HELD, SR., against Farmington City
on the issue of his right to store nonoperable automobiles at
the Davis County seat in Farmington, Utah.

(See Appendix F.)

The question must be asked as to who was more at fault on
10

December 13, 1989f

trial counsel who did not indicate the

potential conflict between two divisions of the same district
court or the trial judge who failed to interrogate counsel as to
genuinely disputed issues and to delay the hearing so that
depositions could be taken of MELVIN HELD, SR.'S widow and of
Attorney, BILL THOMAS

PETERS, under U.R.C.P.

56(c)

(See

Appendix C.)
Second Question Presented; Did the Court of Appeals err in
summarily affirming the trial court's summary disposition on an
important question of municipal law which will have wide spread
general impact?
There are 228 incorporated cities or towns in Utah who are
members of the Utah League of Cities and Towns. The League has
drafted ordinances for many of its members about half of which
are estimated to have ordinances dealing with nonoperational
automobiles though the League maintains no specific records on
the total number.

It is clear that if such ordinances are

selectively enforced, as in the case at bar, the questions
presented are of wide spread impact.
questions

of

U.S.

Constitutional

Serious constitutional

stature

under

the

Fifth

Amendment, taking of an important real property right without
compensation and denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, are presented.

The Writ of

Certiorari should be granted and amicus briefs invited from as
many of the 228 incorporated cities as may be affected.

11

A decision by the Utah Supreme Court on the facts of the
case at bar will prevent future selective enforcement of the
existing ordinances as has occurred in both the Justice of the
Peace, the District Court, and the Utah Court of Appeals.

The

conflict between the definition of a nonoperational vehicle as
contained in the Centerville municipal ordinance drafted for the
City by the Utah League of Cities and Towns in December of 1985
which defines a motor vehicle as nonoperational unless it is
currently inspected, registered, and licensed for road use, and
Section 41-1-79.5 UCA as amended 1965 which states that a motor
vehicle is only inoperable if, after inspection by an agent of
the State Tax Commission, it is determined that, '"the vehicle in
question cannot be rebuilt or reconstructed in such a manner as
to allow its use on the highways of the State as a selfpropelled

vehicle"

Centerville

City

will

be

resolved.

Ordinances.

(See

See Appendix

Appendix

E, Utah

D,

State

Statutes.)
The Writ should be granted to deal with the impact of the
newly created class of "Collector motor vehicles11 under 41-1195, 41-1-196(3) UCA 1953 as amended April 23. 1990. which
permits citizens of the State to collect, and by implication,
therefore, to store and to maintain on their private property
within the municipality where they reside, any number of motor
vehicles over 20 years of age which are not used on the highway
and have been acquired primarily as collector's items.

12

(See

Appendix E for full text effective April 23, 1990.)

(Emphasis

supplied.)
The Utah League of Cities and Towns estimates that of its
228 members, half, or approximately 114 cities and towns, have
ordinances

substantially

similar

to

those

of

the

Defendant/Respondents which are complained of in this case.
With half or more of the cities and town affected by the issues
presented in this Petition, it is clear that the Utah Court of
Appeals has decided a case which should be decided by the Utah
Supreme Court because of its wide spread impact.
J. VAL ROBERTS alleges under oath in the Verified Petition
for Writ

of

Certiorari

that

the

newly

created

class

of

"collector motor vehicles" includes all 28 of the Volkswagen
automobiles which the City has sought to force Petitioner to
remove by the Lower Court's Permanent Injunction Order through
the

application

of

its

overly

broad,

punitive,

and

unconstitutional ordinances. The new State Statute renders all
conflicting

city

ordinances,

whether

of

the

Defendant/

Respondents or of similarly situated municipalities anywhere in
the State of Utah, void from and after April 23, 1990, and makes
a

nullity

of

language

in

such

ordinances

which

requires

mechanical inspections, emissions inspections, current licenses,
current

registration,

and

general

highway

worthiness

preconditions to a citizen's right to store such vehicles on any
property privately owned with any city in the State of Utah
provided the vehicles meet the definition of being more that 20
13

years old and having been acquired as collector's items and are
not used on the highway.
The two 1976 Toyota sedans stored on the ROBERTS' property
are neither wrecked, abandoned, nor inoperable as the same is
defined by UCA 41-1-79.5 thus rendering the decision of the
Lower Court and the sustaining decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals nullities if Petitioners are afforded the protection of
41-1-195 thru 198 UCA 1953 as amended April 23, 1990.
Third Question Presented:
failing

to

recognize

Did the Court of Appeals err by
the

improper

motives

of

Defendant/Respondents in making Plaintiff/Petitioners the only
person against whom a 38-year old lapsed ordinance had ever been
enforced?
Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, having some training in the
law, has pondered what motive or motives, what anger or what
frustration, what public policy or what public need could be so
strong

as to cause

Centerville

City

to

initiate

criminal

prosecution against a citizen of 3 0 years standing beginning as
far back as 1984 in the Justice Court of JAMES G. PARRISH, with
prosecution by Attorney KEITH L. STAHLE? What motive or emotion
would later cause the City to appoint a special prosecutor pro
tern, and a special justice of the peace pro tern, to bring a new
complaint authorized by the new Justice of the Peace, JERALD
JENSEN, who went form being a City Council member to appointed
Justice of the Peace and who sat on the same City council which
initially

solicited

the prosecution
14

of J. VAL ROBERTS

for

storage of inoperable automobiles on the private property which
he shares as a joint tenant with Petitioner, VERLE ROBERTS?
What motive could be so strong as to impel the City officials
and a former City Council member, now Justice of the Peace, to
broaden the scope of prosecution to include Petitioner, J. VAL
ROBERTS'S, wife?

To insist on sending uniformed officers to

serve the misdemeanor complaints and their several amendments at
the Petitioners's residence where the teenage children were
drawn into the controversy even after Petitioners were duly
represented

by

Attorney

BRIAN

M.

BARNARD

and

Defendant/Respondents and their agents had full knowledge of
such representation?
The material contained in Appendix G showing an effort to
coerce Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, into donating 600 square feet
of real property for a sidewalk easement fronting the Utah State
Rod 106 together with a letter written by Petitioner, J. VAL
ROBERTS, to the Utah State Department of Transportation citing
the dangerous nature of the right-of-way design in front of
Petitioner's home in Centerville as well as the potential for
liability

and

suggesting

that

sufficient

right-of-way

be

purchased by either the City of the State to elevate the problem
is the most plausible explanation of the actions
Defendant/Respondents.

for the

The plausibility of this explanation is

vouched for by the fact that abutting property owners on the
north and the south of Petitioner's real property have been
persuaded by the Defendant/Respondents to sign quit-claim deeds
15

for

the

desired

easements

in

exchange

for

the

sidewalk

improvements being paid for by the City and the State from
highway safety grants.

The documents contained in Appendix G

show a renewal of the Defendant/Respondents' attempt to obtain
the desired easement without paying the required compensation.
It is respectfully suggested that actions speak louder than
words and are a clearer indication of motives than anything that
individuals are willing to articulate.
Fourth Question Presented: Did the Court of Appeals err by
not holding both the trial judge and trial counsel to an equally
high

standard

of

judicial

conduct

and

professional

representation as established by recent decisions of this Court
and by the language of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure?
In dealing with motions for summary judgment under Rule 56
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the statutory language
makes

no distinction

between the

standard

of

professional

conduct to which trial counsel is held in raising issues of fact
which make summary judgment inappropriate and the standard of
judicial

conduct

to which

a trial

judge

is held

in his

interrogation of counsel, his inquiry into what material facts
are in good faith controverted.

It is incumbent upon the trial

court judge to make an order specifying which facts appear
without

substantial

controversy

and directing

such

further

proceedings as are just including depositions of additional
witness and publication of existing depositions such as that of
16

Centerville City's Zoning Inspector RANDY RANDALL. If the trial
court judge had discharged his duty under Rule 56(d) (Appendix
C), he would have discovered from Defendant's counsel, JODY
BURNETT, that Centerville City had never enforced any of its
ordinances involving the storage of used automobiles whether
partially dismantled, rusted, or otherwise against anyone other
the Petitioners in the case at bar. The trial court judge would
have discovered that the only other person whom the City of
Centerville could say had cooperated with them, had sold the
property to the City for a fire station or had merely relocated
unused automobiles from the public street to his own private
property.

The trial court would have discovered, upon proper

interrogation of counsel, that Petitioners' property had always
been zoned A-l, not A-2, and had not been used solely as
residential property but had been the regular abode of numerous
cattle, pigs, and chickens.

(See Appendix B, TR page 13, line

21.)
It is hornbook law that defaults and summary judgments are
generally frowned upon by the entire judicial system, and the
case

at bar

clearly

illustrates

the

frailties

of

summary

disposition of contested matters such as was done by the trial
court and the Utah Court of Appeals in the case at bar.
DEAN SAMUEL THURMAN, formerly Dean of the University of
Utah College of Law, stated in a legal ethics class attended by
Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, in December of 1971, "If honest
people believe that something is wrong with the law or that
17

there ought to be a law to solve a social problem, you may rely
upon the fact that something is wrong with the law or that
somewhere, in some jurisdiction, there

is already a model

statute that solves the problem."
The State of Utah, by enacting the collector automobile
statute of April 23, 1990, has come recently to a realization of
an ongoing love affair between citizens and their automobiles
even when the same are rusty or partially dismantled and are not
suitable for use a transportation on the highways and byways of
the State. The Writ of Certiorari should be granted in order to
five full effect to the statute and to insure Petitioners their
rights under the law.
If all of the issues raised in the Petition are to be
addressed,

Petitioner

request that

the

Court

conduct oral

argument in camera and invite amicus briefs from interested
municipalities, the Volkswagen Club of America, Utah Chapter,
the Classic Car Collector's Club; and if the Court finds that
this Petition lacks the organization and polish necessary for
the economical application of the Court's time to the issues, it
has the authority and power to do as it did in Robert Dunn v.
Gerald L. Cook, Warden, Utah State Prison, State of Utah, Case
No. 880067, decided April 2, 1990, (Appendix F) and invite
competent Appellate

counsel

to rebrief

the

issues thereby

assuring Petitioners State and Federal Constitutional rights
under

the

Fifth

and

Fourteenth

Constitution.
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Amendments

to

the

U.S.

If the Court desired to have the case resolved without
reaching the issued raised, it appears that counsel for the
Petitioners, J. VAL ROBERTS, and counsel for the Respondent,
JODY K. BURNETT, have a duty under the Rules of Appellate
Procedure to determine whether or not they can agree that 41-1195 thru 198 as amended April 23, 1990, has not, in fact, made
it mandatory that the parties stipulate to an order vacating the
decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the Trial court
thereby rendering the issues moot.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the Court to grant a Writ of
Certiorari.
Dated this 30th day of June, 1990.

J/ VAIUP.OB
Attorney at Law
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before be on

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at X^Wg*^f &&*£
My commission expires:

J*/?/
s
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy
of the foregoing VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI this
2nd day of JuLbf. 1990, to the following:

Jody K. Burnett,

Daniel D. Hill, Attorneys for Defendant/Respondents, of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, Post
Office Bos 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145.

Attorney at Law
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